Did Ancestry Violate Copyright Law?. . . . It Depends. . . .Part 4 of 4

Here are some important observations before we go on:

(1) Ancestry's IBC is operationally unlike Google's search engine. "Fair use" and direct infringement cases are highly fact-specific.

(2) Whether Google's search engine is or is not "fair use" has yet to be considered adequately
by a court because:

1. The Field case involves unique facts (i.e., the plaintiff "set up" Google to get money from them.
2. The Parker case relies to some extent on the Field case. The U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in Parker, but ordered that its decision not be published. This means that it cannot be relied upon as precedent by other courts. It also may signal that the Court of Appeals does not have full confidence in the decision.

I do not agree that the Field case "clears away copyright questions that have troubled the entire search engine industry," as an attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation said.

[For the record, I am not a Google-basher. I like Google. While we're at it, I generally like Ancestry.com, too, and I use it frequently. But I was angry to discover my content on their IBC.]

(3) It is possible that Ancestry.com, Google, or somebody else, could set up a genealogy-specific search engine that would "fairly use" both links and a cache of copyright-protected Web sites.

Now back to our series.

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act

In 1998, the Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA). There are a number of aspects to this statute, but here, the relevant matter is in Title II of the Act, which is known as the “Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act.” This part of the law creates limitations on the liability of online service providers for copyright infringement when engaging in certain types of activities. I discuss it here because the court in Field v. Google discussed it and several commenters have mentioned it.

Section 512(b) of the Act provides the so-called system caching "safe harbor" for online service providers. An online service provider is not liable for for infringement of copyright by reason of the "intermediate and temporary storage of material on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider" in certain circumstances. Those circumstances are where:

(A) the material is made available online by a person other than the service provider;

(B) the material is transmitted from the person described in subparagraph (A) through the system or network to a person other than the person described in subparagraph (A) at the direction of that other person; and

(C) the storage is carried out through an automatic technical process for the purpose of making the material available to users of the system or network who, after the material is transmitted as described in subparagraph (B), request access to the material from the person described in subparagraph (A), if the conditions set forth in paragraph (2) are met.

Before we go onto paragraph (2), let's examine the portions above. First, the cache must be "intermediate and temporary." In Field v. Google cache , the court had evidence before it that Google stored material for 14 to 20 days. Relying on a case called Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004), involving AOL, the Field court held that 14 to 20 days was "intermediate and temporary."

We don't know how long Ancestry planned to keep material in its cache. There are hints in the company's statements that can be interpreted to suggest a temporary cache and hints that suggest a longer storage. I would suggest that 14-20 days is probably on the outer limits of the plain meaning of "intermediate and temporary." Certainly, if Ancestry intended to keep material in its cache longer than that, they would not qualify for the infringement liability "safe harbor."

Now here's the analysis of the rest of paragraph (1):

(A) the material is made available online by a person other than the service provider;

This provision is met when the copyright holder posts his or her content online. The content owner is "a person other than the service provider."

(B) the material is transmitted from the person described in subparagraph (A) through the system or network to a person other than the person described in subparagraph (A) at the direction of that other person;

This means that the copyrighted content is accessed by someone other than the copyright owner from the copyright owner. Note that this provision suggests a very temporary caching, because the caching takes place when the content is accessed by a user from the content provider's site. In Field, the court got this wrong. The court described Google, the service provider, as the "other person." If Congress had intended the service provider to be "the other person," Congress would have said so.

The point here is that to take advantage of the safe harbor, Ancestry would have to cache the material temporarily as it was being transmitted between content provider and content user. That's not how they described what they were doing. Further evidence of my point is in subparagraph (C):

(C) the storage is carried out through an automatic technical process for the purpose of making the material available to users of the system or network who, after the material is transmitted as described in subparagraph (B), request access to the material from the person described in subparagraph (A) . . . .

A leading copyright expert says about this provision:

Thus, the literal language of Section 512(b) appears not to cover “advance” caching, in which material is copied into a cache for anticipated requests for it, rather than upon the first actual request for it . . . .

David L. Hayes, Advanced Copyright Issues on the Internet (2007) [The link is to a 412-page document. The quote is on page 307.]

This interpretation is also borne out by the legislative history of the DCMA. House of Representatives Report No. 105-551, part2, page 52, includes the following:

For subsection (b) to apply, the material must be made available on an originating site, transmitted at the direction of another person through the system or network
operated by or for the service provider to a different person, and stored through an automatic technical process so that users of the system or network who subsequently request access to the material from the originating site may obtain access to the material from the system or network.

Ancestry was doing "advance" caching, which would not protect it from infringement claims under the DCMA.

Recall that the safe harbor also requires that "the conditions set forth in paragraph (2) are met." Having already found that Ancestry would not qualify for the DCMA safe harbor, we can assume that Ancestry would meet the other requirements without changing the result.

A careful reading of the DMCA leads to the conclusion that Ancestry's IBC would not be safe from infringement claims under the Copyright Act.

Having spent a considerable amount of time on this, I need to take a day off. I meant this to be a four-part series, but so many good questions have been raised in the comments that I will answer (many of them, if not all) in one more post on Friday. Then I'll get back to being a genealogist in this space.


COMING ON FRIDAY: Some Final Thoughts

Notice: The information in this writing is intended for educational use only and is not intended nor should it be construed as legal advice. If you have a legal problem, consult a lawyer admitted to practice in your state of residence. I am an active member of the bar of the State of California and am admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court and various other federal courts. I am not licensed to practice in any other state. I am not presently soliciting or accepting new clients in the matters discussed above.

Did Ancestry Violate Copyright Law? . . . . Part 3of 4: Fair Use

We've explored the Field v. Google, Inc., case thus far and learned about the facts of that case and some of the holdings. A number of commenters have insisted (and still insist) that because the court found Google's caching to be "fair use," the same result would obtain with respect to Ancestry's Internet Biographical Collection.

I do believe that the matter of "fair use" is the most important issue in the analysis. But, I've said here that these cases are highly fact-specific. So before we get to the fair use analysis, let's take a look at some of the factual matters that various commenters have raised since we started this series.

Janice said:

I do have two comments. I'm not sure it changes things in a legal sense, but Ancestry also provided an option (to subscribers only, and even after IBC became "free") to click and save the cached page to their "Shoebox"--a holding area of documents that subscribers are interested in.

Also, the initial Ancestry.com source description calls the IBC a "database-online," not a search engine (I have a screen shot of that if you need it).

Jeff Scism said:

Ancestry through a spokesperson clearly stated what the intent was initially, "the websites have VALUE. And even if the site owners were to remove the contents, the pages would remain available through Ancestry.com"

That indicates to my simple mind that, since only paying customers had original access, that Ancestry had premeditated their intent to take and sell the content, despite what the site owners decided to do with their creations. Their obvious attempt to actually hide the source pages at first and only provide a sanitized copy of the data- removing source website info, and identifying graphics, and copyright notices, shows that the intent was to steal and sell the content.

Another issue not addressed is that Family Tree maker, a genealogy program they sell, still has this search built in, and provides the data directly for merging into your family file, sourcing it as Ancestry's collection, and no direct reference to the authors.

And Ancestry said on August 28, 2007:

Ancestry.com just added the Internet Biographical Collection which is a compilation of genealogy information across the web.

I also recommend that you check out the comments on Dick Eastman's blog here and here.

Now, on to "Fair Use."

"Fair Use" is a limitation on the exclusive rights of a copyright owner. It's contained in section 107 of the Copyright Act. [Title 17, United States Code]. The Act says that use "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research is not an infringement of copyright ." The United States Supreme Court has stated that the statute "calls for case-by-case analysis." [Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 US 569 (1994)]. In that respect, a court must analyze at least four factors:

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.

Factor 1: Purpose and Character of the Use

In the case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme Court said about this first factor of the "fair use" analysis:

The enquiry here may be guided by the examples given in the preamble to § 107, looking to whether the use is for criticism, or comment, or news reporting, and the like . . . . The central purpose of this investigation is to see . . . whether the new [use] merely “supersedes the objects” of the original creation . . . or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is “transformative” . . . . [510 US at 578-579]

The Field court looked to a case decided by the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to understand how to apply this "transformative" rule. (As a trial court within the Ninth Circuit, which covers the Far West, the federal district court in Nevada is obligated to follow the precedent of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).

The case which the court followed is called Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F3d 811 (2003). In that case, the appeals court held that the use of copyrighted images that were displayed on Internet web sites by an operator of a "visual search engine," which displayed search results as “thumbnail” pictures, was “fair use” of copyrighted images.

But before we jump to any conclusions about Ancestry's IBC, it's important to understand why the court came to that conclusion in the Kelly case.

Arriba, now known as "Ditto.com," developed a computer program that “crawls” the web looking for images to index. This crawler downloads full-sized copies of the images onto Arriba's server. The program then uses these copies to generate smaller, lower-resolution thumbnails of the images. Once the thumbnails are created, the program deletes the full-sized originals from the server. Although a user could copy these thumbnails to a computer or disk, the user cannot increase the resolution of the thumbnail; any enlargement would result in a loss of clarity of the image.


The court found Arriba's use of Kelly's photographs to be "transformative," that is, Arriba's use "added a further purpose or different character" to the photographs. The court said:

Kelly's images are artistic works intended to inform and to engage the viewer in an aesthetic experience. His images are used to portray scenes from the American West in an aesthetic manner. Arriba's use of Kelly's images in the thumbnails is unrelated to any aesthetic purpose. Arriba's search engine functions as a tool to help index and improve access to images on the Internet and their related web sites. In fact, users are unlikely to enlarge the thumbnails and use them for artistic purposes because the thumbnails are of much lower-resolution than the originals; any enlargement results in a significant loss of clarity of the image, making them inappropriate as display material. [336 F3d at 818].

The court observed that Arriba's thumbnails of Kelly's photographs "are not used for illustrative or artistic purposes and therefore do not supplant the need for the originals." [336 F3d at 820]

The question now is whether, using this reasoning, Ancestry's use of others' content in its IBC was "transformative." I would note first that, unlike Arriba with respect to Kelly, Ancestry is in the same field of endeavor as are the copyright owners whose material was used in the IBC. Ancestry's purposes seem to have been the same as that of the content owners. Ancestry initially described the IBC as a "collection," not a search engine. It would thus appear that Ancestry simply intended to make available on its genealogical site, initially for a fee, the exact same content owned by others. Unlike the "thumbnails" of "much lower-resolution than the originals" in Kelly's case, the entire content of any collected site was available in the IBC. In other words, Ancestry's use merely superseded that of the content owners. This is not a transformative use.

It cannot be said that either Field or Kelly, either individually or taken together, endorsed as "fair use" anything denominated a "search engine." Again, the determination of "fair use" is fact-specific. For example, Google's search engine operates somewhat differently than did Arriba's. Along these lines, it is not at all clear that the IBC operated, or was intended to operate, like Google's or Arriba's search engines. The term "search engine" in reference to the IBC did not appear until after the controversy erupted.

For another example, is Google Books merely a "search engine"? I think as it was originally conceived, it was more of an electronic library than a search engine. Hence, the concern by publishers. But, as it now operates, Google Books is a bit of both search engine and electronic library. With respect to certain items now beyond copyright protection (those for which the user gets "Full View"), the electronic library aspect is fully operational. With respect to those items given the most protection (those for which the reader is given only a "Snippet"), Google Books is almost entirely a search engine. In the full electronic library mode, Google's use clearly supersedes that of the original content creator.

Ancestry's IBC, as we originally understood it, was more like Google Books than like Google's "simple" search engine.

The court also considered the commercial use of Kelly's work:

While such use of Kelly's images was commercial, it was more incidental and less exploitative in nature than more traditional types of commercial use. Arriba was neither using Kelly's images to directly promote its web site nor trying to profit by selling Kelly's images [336 F3d at 818]

These do not seem to be the facts of Ancestry's use, especially when the content was behind their paid subscriber wall.

Factor 2: Nature of the Copyrighted Work

The second statutory factor, “the nature of the copyrighted work,” draws on the value of the materials used. Works that are creative in nature are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than are more fact-based works. [Kelly v. Arriba, 336 F3d at 820]. The court found Kelly's work to be creative, as would be found as to the content collected by Ancestry for the IBC.

The court also said that the fact that a work is published or unpublished also is a critical element of its nature. Published works are more likely to qualify as fair use because the first appearance of the artist's expression has already occurred. [Kelly v. Arriba, 336 F3d at 820] The court found that these two elements caused this factor to weigh in favor of Kelly, but only slightly. The same could be said of the content included in the IBC. All of it had appeared on the Internet before it appeared in the IBC.

Factor 3: Amount and substantiality of portion used.

In Kelly v. Arriba, the court said:

While wholesale copying does not preclude fair use per se, copying an entire work militates against a finding of fair use. However, the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use. If the secondary user only copies as much as is necessary for his or her intended use, then this factor will not weigh against him or her. [336 F3d at 820-821]

The IBC seems to have copied the entirety of the works collected for the IBC. But what is the extent of permissible copying in light of the purpose and character of use in this situation?

In Field v. Google, the court said:

. . . Google’s use of entire Web pages in its Cached links serves multiple transformative and socially valuable purposes. These purposes could not be effectively accomplished by using only portions of the Web pages. Without allowing access to the whole of a Web page, the Google Cached link cannot assist Web users (and content owners) by offering access to pages that are otherwise unavailable. Nor could use of less than the whole page assist in the archival or comparative purposes of Google’s “Cached” links. Finally, Google’s offering of highlighted search terms in cached copies of Web pages would not allow users to understand why a Web page was deemed germane if less than the whole Web page were provided. Because Google uses no more of the works than is necessary in allowing access to them through “Cached” links, the third fair use factor is neutral, despite the fact that Google allowed access to the entirety of Field’s works. [412 FSupp2d at 1121]

The Field court's reasoning might apply to Ancestry's IBC if the IBC had the same function and functionality as Google's search engine. And it's not clear that the IBC operated like Google's search engine. Ancestry could have copied only a"snippet" of the collected IBC works and included a link to the original and still have accomplished a worthy purpose--much like Google Books does.

Factor 4: The Effect of the Use upon the Potential Market for or Value of the Copyrighted Work

The Kelly court said:

This last factor requires courts to consider "not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also 'whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the
defendant ... would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential
market for the original.' " [336 F3d at 821, citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.]

There are several potential markets for the content collected in the IBC. Many of the content owners sell advertising space on their sites. Ancestry obviously found the content valuable enough to initially place it behind their paid subscriber wall; a content owner could license their content to some potential competitor of Ancestry's, like World Vital Records, for example. It could be reasonably said that Ancestry's actions could harm the potential market for the content owners' products. Some portion of the potential audience for the content would find it first at Ancestry's site and because of the way it initially was set up at the IBC, that audience would find no need to go to the original site. And this is particularly so if, as alleged by one of the commenters, Ancestry has linked the IBC to the Family Tree Maker software.

Based on the foregoing analysis of the cases, a court could find that Ancestry's use was not a "fair use."

Here are several points to keep in mind:

(1) What's said above is based on the premise that Ancestry's IBC is not like Google's search engine. For example, as far as we know, the IBC did not include a statement on "cached" pages that the user is viewing only a cached page. (Later, of course, Ancestry added links to the original pages). I think the two things may be factually distinguishable.

(2) Field should not necessarily be relied upon, because it's the classic example of bad facts making bad law. That is to say, to take a general rule out of that case is a bad idea because the facts are so unique and egregious.

(3) There are a lot of facts about the IBC that remain known only to Ancestry. Some of those facts may help them; some may hurt them.

(4) Nobody, not a lawyer, not the Copyright Office, nobody but a court can finally settle what is or is not "fair use."

I'm going to move our discussion of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to tomorrow's post. In that post, I'll also address some issues that have come up in the Comments and share some thoughts on copyright protection.

Did Ancestry Violate the Copyright Law? . . . Prologue

Part I of A Legal Analysis of the Late Controversy

By now, the brouhaha over Ancestry.com's "Internet Biographical Collection" has largely blown over. Ancestry has said that they will permanently remove the database and the genealogical community is ready to move on.

The passage of a little time and the cooling of passion on the issue permits some calm and reasoned examination of the legal issues raised by the episode. This examination is necessary, I think, to inform the community and to provide a background against which we may judge the next episode. This examination also, I hope, will provide some ideas about how to protect, yet share our efforts, in the interests of genealogical research.

Full Disclosure: GeneaBlogie was one of the blogs the content of which appeared in the "Internet Biographical Collection" (which I will hereafter refer to as "IBC"--lawyers love abbreviations and acronyms). My initial reaction was like that of others whose content was thus appropriated--anger.

The Facts: Every legal analysis must begin with the facts of the particular situation. The application of the law depends on specific factual circumstances. Unfortunately, in this case, some of the relevant facts are known only to Ancestry.com. We do not have the benefit of discovering all of those facts as we would in litigation. So we present here the facts as we know them:

In the last week of August, 2007, Ancestry.com added the IBC to its site. Ancestry described the IBC as "a compilation of genealogy information across the web." In fact, on the day I first viewed the IBC, having been alerted by another member of the community, the IBC appeared to be copies of websites. Ancestry said, "The site is also displaying a live link back to the source site where the information was extracted." Ancestry described the IBC as a "search engine" and stated, "We cached individual Web pages in an effort to preserve history – if a Web page featuring important family history information were taken down in the future, a cached version would still be available." For several days, the information was in the paid-subscriber section of Ancestry's site. Later, Ancestry announced, "Based on community response to the addition of the Internet Biographical Collection, Ancestry.com has decided to make the database free." The company said that "the goal behind the collection is to help surface genealogical information that many people would not be able to find easily because it is often scattered among numerous websites across the Internet."

When Ancestry announced the removal of the IBC, they said, "We had hoped to provide a way for you to be able to search the entire web easily for genealogically-relevant pages and provide for preservation of sources for future generations." The announcement added that the company "hope[d] that someday we’ll be able to provide a free web search engine that links directly back to the live web pages, and can become a useful tool to the genealogical community."

Each of these actions and statements by Ancestry.com has legal significance.

Below are some concepts necessary to our legal analysis.

The Basic Copyright Law: Title 17 of the United States Code is the copyright law in the United States. It protects "original works of authorship," both published and unpublished. Among other things, the law protects the author's right to reproduce the work in copies; to prepare derivative works based upon the work; to distribute copies of the work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; and to display the work publicly.

No publication or registration is required to secure copyright. Copyright protection subsists from the time the work is created in fixed form. The copyright in the work of authorship immediately becomes the property of the author who created the work. Only the author or those deriving their rights through the author can rightfully claim copyright.

Violation of any of the rights provided by the copyright law to the owner of copyright is contrary to law and may subject the violator to civil or criminal penalties.

A significant limitation on the exclusive rights of a copyright holder is the doctrine of fair use. We discussed this concept several months ago in this post.

The Digital Millenium Copyright Act: In 1998, the Congress enacted the Digital Millenium Copyright Act. There are a number of aspects to this statute, but here, the relevant matter is in Title II of the Act, which is known as the “Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act.” This part of the law creates limitations on the liability of online service providers for copyright infringement when engaging in certain types of activities.

A Computer Science Concept--Caching: A "cache" is a collection of data duplicating original values stored elsewhere or computed earlier. In other words, a cache is a temporary storage area where frequently accessed data can be stored for rapid access. Once the data is stored in the cache, future use can be made by accessing the cached copy rather than re-fetching the original data. On-line service providers make local copies of Web pages so that the pages don't have to be fetched again and again. Another purpose of caching Web pages is to preserve copies for retrieval in the event the original cannot be accessed.

Prologue to The Legal Analysis

A number of bloggers and commenters opined that what Ancestry had done was a form of "caching" no different than that which Google or any other search engine does. However, there appear to be factual differences between Ancestry's IBC as Ancestry itself described it and Google's search engine operations. The issue is whether these factual differences have any legal significance.

In several commentaries on the Ancestry IBC, I saw the case of Field v. Google cited. Preliminarily, I would observe that there are some unique facts in that case that may have affected the outcome. Second, I would note that as a decision of a federal district court, a trial court, it has no precedential value; that is, it need not be followed by any other court. [It was, however, cited by the federal district court in Pennsylvania which decided a case called Parker v. Google].

Having said that, I do think that both Field and Parker provide convenient frameworks for analyzing this issue. We'll post on that tomorrow. And I'll try to keep it understandable.

TOMORROW: The Legal Analysis--Part I


Notice: The information in this writing is intended for educational use only and is not intended nor should it be construed as legal advice. If you have a legal problem, consult a lawyer admitted to practice in your state of residence. I am an active member of the bar of the State of California and am admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court and various other federal courts. I am not licensed to practice in any other state. I am not presently soliciting or accepting new clients in the matters discussed above.